Russia after the elections
Alan Woods looks at the realities behind Yeltsin's victory
The July elections represent another turn in the situation in Russia. On the surface, the result was a massive victory for Russian capitalism. Despite the frightful collapse in living standards, crime, corruption and mafia capitalism, Yeltsin won. This was a heavy defeat for Stalinism, not socialism or genuine communism, but it will usher in a new period of convulsions for Russia.
The underlying processes remain as contradictory and explosive as before. The result has resolved nothing. Despite everything, the CP still made a strong showing. Zyuganov defeated Yeltsin in the "Red Belt" area stretching from Tambov and Voronezh, south of Moscow, to Siberian regions such as Novosibirsk, Omsk and the coal mining area of Kemerovo. We can assume that the CP maintained its support in the other mining areas, and in the workers in heavy industry in general. 40% is a considerable base in society, and this would undoubtedly include the decisive layers of the industrial workers, as well as the rural areas.
The response of the bourgeois to the result was euphoric. Russian financial markets soared, but then fell back as it became clear that Western investors were not participating in the buying spree. The western capitalists, while breathing a sigh of relief that Zyuganov was not elected, are still worried about the future.
Were the elections rigged?
Can these results be the result of fraud? Since the elections, there has been more than sufficient evidence pointing to the existence of widespread ballot rigging. The CSCE observers found evidence of widespread electoral fraud. Even before the first round, the then Defence Minister Pavel Grachev announced that sailors in the fleet outside Russia had voted "unanimously" for Yeltsin. Even more incredibly, Yeltsin's highest vote was supposed to have come from Chechnya-64. 1%-a remarkable result for a man who had ordered the bloody war resulting in the mass slaughter of the Chechen people and the reduction of their homeland to ashes! Andrei Kolganov and Alexander Buzgalin, two left wing economists at Moscow State University, state that An element of fraud cannot be excluded (though in the view of experts, this could hardly have exceeded 35°/0)." If we assume that ballot rigging amounted to 5% of the votes, Yeltsin's majority would be cut to a bare minimum. However, since it is notoriously difficult to obtain precise figures in cases of electoral fraud, the estimates of the "experts" may understate the real position. Socialist Boris Kagarlitsky implies that fraud was more widespread than this. He writes:
"The second round Russian election began inauspiciously for the authorities. "Throughout the morning the population of St. Petersburg, a city considered a major stronghold of the present regime, simply failed to turn up at the polling stations. People were clearly sick of elections. By 3 p.m. only about 4% of electors had voted. A low turnout was also evident in other regions where Boris Yeltsin had come out ahead in the first round. Something close to panic broke out in the president's campaign team. A state television announcer let slip the news that'catastrophic moods' had seized hold of the campaign staff.
"After 4 p.m., however, something happened. As if someone had waved a magic wand, the low turnout was everywhere replaced by a high one, in some places exceeding the results of the first round. If we are able to believe official reports, the citizens of Russia turned up as a body at the polling stations, and in no less united fashion, voted for Yeltsin.
"The more remote and inaccessible the region, the greater the support for the president. The people of the ChuLokta peninsula in the far northeast showed particular enthusiasm for Yeltsin, giving him 75% of the vote - a remarkable result, especially if we consider that in the heat of the election campaign the authorities had forgotten to ship foodstuffs to ChukotLa, and the danger of starvation hung over the region."
Anomalies
The Guardian (5/7/96) makes out a similar case:"There were some startling proYeltsin anomalies in the Red Belt, suggesting either the powerful personal influence of local bosses in ethnicallybased regions or fraud.
"The most suspicious result was in the North Caucasian republic of Daghestan, long a bastion of Communist support. In June, Mr. Zyuganov won 66 per cent of the vote, against 26 per cent for Mr. Yeltsin, with Lobed barely registering. This week, Mr. Yeltsin's vote shot Up to 51 per cent, with Mr. Zyuganov down to 46.
"Almost as dubious was the result in the oilrich Volga republic of BashLortostan, where a largely Muslim population traditionally backs the Communists. How Zyuganov lead of 42 to 35 per cent in June turned into a Yeltsin triumph of 52 to 42 per cent this week is a mystery"
Before the election, Zyuganov had warned of the danger of fraud. After the result of the second round was declared, he pointed out that "ln Daghestan we got 60% last time, and now they say we've lost there. I want to figure out how that could have happened in the last ten days." The Italian paper La Stampa, which is generally considered to be in close contact with the reality of Russian political life, and evidently has excellent sources, published an article on July 6th entitled "Fraud- here is the proof." Analysing the results of the first round, it concludes that: "in any other country, these figures would have caused a scandal of international proportions, whereas in Russia they circulate in 'samizdat"'. The figures referred to are taken from the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan. They prove conclusively the existence of massive fraud. La Stampa's correspondent had access to the voting figures given at different levels. At the lowest level, the Local Electoral Commission represents 60 polling stations. These results are then submitted to the Regional Electoral Commission (in this case, Tatarstan), which finally sends them to the Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation. The La Stampa article shows that the results do not add up. Votes were systematically subtracted from all other candidates, and transferred to Yeltsin's list. For example, in one area of Tatarstan, the discrepancy was as follows:
| Yeltsin real vote | 71,000 |
| Yeltsin official vote | 207,000 |
| Zyuganov real vote | 68,000 |
| Zyuganov official vote | 59,000 |
| Lebed real vote | 35,000 |
| Lebed official vote | 25,000 |
Other areas showed similar discrepancies. La Stampa concludes that, if this was the case in Tatarstan, there is no reason to suppose that it was any different elsewhere. It further concludes that such fraud could only be carried out with the participation of a large number of functionaries right up to the top government level, where no checks were carried out. It is unthinkable that the Central Commission was not aware of this. In other words, the ballot rigging was organised at the highest level. The article ends with the following question: "Does this mean that the Communists, in reality, won the first round?"
There is no doubt that Yeltsin rigged the vote in the referendum on the Constitution. Even bourgeois commentators accept that. So, if it looked as if Zyuganov was going to win, there can be no doubt that Yeltsin supporters would have resorted to massive ballotrigging to fix the result. The Russian bourgeoisie and the West could not permit Zyuganov to win. In the words of Time's Moscow correspondent Bruce Nelan, "It would have been a disaster for all concerned had the Russians elected Zyuganov....ln the end they voted for the lesser evil." However, the same correspondent warns against drawing too optimistic conclusions: "There are still serious problems in Russia that need to be resolved. The Western idea that the problems will all disappear with the reelection of Yeltsin is simply wrong."
The "free" press
During the campaign, the socalled "free press" and television behaved in a manner so depraved that it made the Western gutter press look quite demure by comparison. Even the Western proYeltsin commentators were forced to express their discontent at the way the media favoured the President. The Economist referred to "a slavishly proYeltsin bias in the Russian media..These facts show the hollowness and hypocrisy of the Western claims that Yeltsin stands for "democracy". On the role of the media, even the main international observer team, organised by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was obliged to state: "Not only was there a significant imbalance in candidate Yeltsin's favour in the amount of coverage but also his campaign was generally shown in positive terms, compared to other candidates, in particular candidate Zyuganov, who tended to be shown in negative terms."
Gleb Pavlovsky, a former journalist and now general director of the Foundation for Effective politics was himself involved in distributing proYeltsin articles to the Russian press, estimated that 1,000 journalists in Moscow alone were on the take, "including an elite group of perhaps 50 big name reporters who received $3,000 to $5,000 per month on top of their other income for writing articles favourable to Yeltsin or other candidates". After the first round the CSCE observers demanded an improvement in the second round. "It is important that the shortcomings mentioned above in the behaviour of the media, the conduct of the election campaign and the polling day procedures be addressed as a matter of urgency."
In reality, the reverse was the case. All the abuses of the first round were deepened in the second. The Daily Telegraph reported, for example: "The selection of news items is even more flagrant Yesterday Victor llyukhin, a senior Communist who heads the security committee of the lower house of Parliament, summoned reporters to see a tape of police questioning a banker who admitted taking $500,000 from the Finance Ministry and giving it to two members or the Yeltsin campaign team. The tape failed to find a place on the early evening news on the Russian Public Television, the most popular channel".
So distorted was the TV coverage, that even news of Yeltsin's illness was suppressed to a large extent. As Tony Barber commented in the Independent: "Clearly, the inability of one of the two presidential candidates to perform his duties would be likely to have a decisive influence on the outcome. So the Russian media simply hushed it up". Constanze Krehl, head of the European parliament delegation observing the second round said: "It is really clear that Mr Yeltsin has more than 400 points of positive coverage... and Mr Zyuganov has minus 300". Yet despite all this, the "democratic" observers from the West were quite prepared to give the Russian elections a clean bill of health!
Why the CP lost?
The main reason why the CP was defeated was because they did not put forward a democratic socialist alternative for the workers and the people of Russia. After decades of totalitarian rule, there is no enthusiasm for a return to Stalinism. The masses are repelled by the chaos, corruption and general rottenness of the Russian gangster bourgeoisie, whose plunder of state assets even the Financial Times described as "the theft of the century." But they have no desire to hand power back to the old Stalinist bureaucracy. They want socialism, but with a democratic regime. In the absence of a democratic socialist alternative, Yeltsin was able to organise a scare campaign. In the circumstances, it is surprising that the CP's vote was as high as it was. In spite of Zyuganov, the bulk of the industrial workers voted for him. But elections are not decided by the industrial working class alone. As in the West, there are intermediate layers, professional people, civil servants, functionaries of all kinds, who would follow the proletariat if the latter was mobilised in action, but, if no lead is given, can be drawn behind the ruling elite by tear, bribery, or a combination of both.
Western economists have roughly calculated the nascent bourgeoisie at about 10% of the population (this would be an extremely broad definition, including all sorts of petty "entrepreneurs," whereas the big capitalists would be a tiny handful ). Together with their families and dependents, and all other layers who are somehow linked to the "market" such as drivers, street traders, selfemployed people, servants, private bodyguards (there are 600,000 of these alone) and criminals, we are talking about maybe 20% of the population. This is approximately the percentage of votes won by all the "promarket" parties in the December elections. It is a not inconsiderable portion of the population, but not enough to win an election.
Coup
There was also another factor. Interviews published in the West with such people gave interesting responses. Many of them were afraid that a Zyuganov victory would have meant a coup and civil war. This appraisal is not wrong. As we have pointed out repeatedly, the bourgeois had no intention of allowing Zyuganov to win. One way or another, he would have been blocked. Such a development would have created an explosive situation, which could have ended in civil war. If Zyuganov had been a genuine Leninist, and not a hopeless reformist, that would have been no obstacle. It is an elementary truth that no ruling class, or, in this case, ruling elite, ever surrenders power without a struggle. If Zyuganov had been a Communist worthy of the name, he would not have confined himself to warnings about voterigging, but would have set up committees to defend democracy in every workplace and locality, composed of the elected representatives, to organise and coordinate the fightback against Yeltsinites and their corrupt, antidemocratic regime. Any violence that ensued would be exclusively the responsibility of this gang of crooks and reactionaries.
A decisive attitude on the part of the workers is the prior condition for winning over the wavering middle layers. Above all, in order to win over the youth, a bold vision is necessary, one which would inspire with hope for the future. But no such perspective was put forward. Zyuganov, in fact, offered no perspective at all. His attitude to the Stalinist past was half apologetic, which gave the Yeltsinites the possibility of identifying him with the crimes of the old regime - concentration camps and so on. Yet Zyuganov did not even clearly advocate the reestablishment of the USSR and a nationalised planned economy. The word socialism was conspicuous by its absence. Instead, he scandalously flirted with Russian chauvinism, even to the point of inviting Orthodox priests onto his platform, a tactic which was grist to the mill of Lebed.
After generations of totalitarian bureaucratic rule, broad layers of society do not want to go back to the Stalinist past. Even when Yeltsin's rating in the polls fell to 5 to 10%, there were still more than 40% of voters who declared that they would not support a KPRF presidential candidate under any circumstances. If we exclude the nascent bourgeois, their dependents and hangerson, this figure still means that millions of workers and youth, who are undoubtedly hostile to Yeltsin and capitalism, have also decisively rejected Stalinism. Only the democratic, internationalist banner of genuine Marxism can win over these layers. By contrast, Zyuganov's combination of Stalinism and nationalism only served to repel them. Despite its huge resources, the KPRF, at the moment of truth, was unable to connect to a wide layer of the population which was looking for a genuine democratic socialist alternative.
After decades of totalitarian and bureaucratic methods, the party leaders had no idea how to appeal to the masses. If Zyuganov's campaign in the first round was bad, in the second it was almost nonexistent. Some of the western commentators were so perplexed that they wondered whether Zyuganov's tactics were not the result of some cunning plan to increase public apathy, and thus cause a low poll, which, allegedly, would benefit the CP. But it is not necessary to seek such a subtle and "profound" explanation. There was no such plan. Zyuganov's failure was the result either of his inability to put a real alternative before the people, or because he was afraid of winning the elections. Most likely, it was a combination of both.
Perspective
Lacking any revolutionary perspective, Zyuganov was terrified of the prospect of civil war. This would have meant leaning on the working class, something which the CP leaders wish to avoid at all costs. Once the workers were aroused, it would be difficult to control them. Under such circumstances, it would not be possible to consolidate a neoStalinist regime. No doubt the Yeltsinites made it clear in advance to Zyuganov that he would not be permitted to take power by electoral means. The choice was clear-either mobilise the masses for an all out struggle for power, or capitulate. It does not require much imagination to understand what occurred between Zyuganov and the leaders of the Yeltsin camp between the first and second rounds, if not before. Once Zyuganov refused to mobilise the working class for action, the result of the election was a foregone conclusion.
Boris Kagarlitsky believes that the CP leaders did a deal with Yeltsin to hand him the elections on a plate, on the understanding that they would be offered positions in the government. For obvious reasons, this cannot be directly proved. However, it would explain a great deal about the complete absence of an election campaign in the second round on the part of the KPRF, the failure to denounce the blatant irregularities after the elections, and the indecent haste with which the CP leaders rushed to accept the idea of accepting posts in Yeltsin's government. While hinting at the possibility of fraud, Zyuganov made no attempt to mobilise any kind of protest movement, but hastened to accept the result as "the will of the people."
The bourgeois in the West could scarcely conceal their glee at the spectacle of this fearsome "Communist" meekly accepting defeat. The Financial Times of July 5th carried the headline "Communists accept defeat like democrats." What the FT means to say is that the Zyuganov wing of the CP have abandoned all pretence at being Communists and openly embraced "democracy," that is, capitalism. Following the Polish CP leaders, they have transformed themselves from Stalinists to Social Democrats. No wonder the western media which yesterday foamed at the mouth against the danger of a Zyuganov victory, now pay hypocritical tribute to this "statesmanlike" behaviour, that is to say, this abject betrayal.
What "will of the people" is Zyuganov talking about, when even the western media is compelled to admit that the whole election campaign was shamefully biased in Yeltsin's favor? Thus, Zyuganov has entirely capitulated to bourgeois ideology in its most vulgar and myopic form, parliamentary cretinism. However, he is not alone in these illusions. The upstart bourgeois, who only weeks ago were panicking at the prospect of a return to "Communism," have now recovered their nerve and succumbed to euphoria. In the same issue, one of the representatives of the Russian bourgeois, Boris Berezovsky, was quoted as saying "We shall never again need to choose between communism and capitalism." The relief of these elements was best expressed by their most consummate representative, Victor Chernomyrdin the day after the election - "The choice is made for a/ways, today democracy has won forever." However, such judgments are premature. From a Marxist point of view, elections in and of themselves solve nothing. In the best case, they provide a snapshot of the mood of the masses at a given moment. But in this case, even that can be doubted.
In any event, the social tendencies are shown here in an extremely mangled and indirect manner, as through a distorting mirror. Had Zyuganov won, that would have been a significant change in the situation, reflecting a major setback for the procapitalist elements. But, for that very reason, it was not going to be allowed to happen. Those who had enriched themselves by plundering the state would not just have handed over with a polite bow. A Zyuganov victory would have brought the country to the brink of civil war. As all history shows, the decisive questions are settled, not by parliamentary arithmetic, but by the struggle of real forces.
However, the fact of Yeltsin's victory does not signify a fundamental change. True, for a time, the probourgeois wing will receive an important access of confidence, while the mood of the working class will be temporarily depressed. The movement in the direction of capitalism will continue and even be speeded up in the next few months. But none of the fundamental contradictions have been removed by the election. On the contrary, they will become enormously exacerbated from now on. Not the July election, but the resolution of these fundamental contradictions, is what will finally determine the outcome.
Trotsky predicted that the restoration of capitalism in Russia, if it occurred, would be a regime of decline. And what a decline! A collapse of more than 50% in the first four years, compared with the 30% drop after the Wall Street crash in 1929. Yet, in spite of this, the CP proved incapable of mobilising the working class to take power. The most important element in the equation is the subjective factor. Zyuganov and the exStalinist leaders of the KPRF act as a powerful brake on the movement. But that will not last. Explosive events will shake the CP from top to bottom.
During the election campaign, Yeltsin promised, among other things, a 20% increase in the minimum wage; holiday pay for teachers; Chechnya reconstruction; support for coal miners; compensation for elderly savers, the elderly and handicapped; increased pensions; writeoff of farm debts; home building loans; payment of all unpaid wages and pensions; more state spending on defence research and development; payment of state debts to power ministries. It has been calculated that the total value of these promises is about 100 trillion roubles ($19.8 billion). The problem with a promissory note, however, is that eventually it is called in. And where do you get the funds to draw on?
Thus, not one stone upon another will remain of Yeltsin's election promises. Not that he will be much worried about that. The President's health is clearly in a somewhat fragile state. Whether his "indisposition" in the closing stages of the campaign owed more to his heart or a vodka bottle is unclear. But it was sufficient to set the alarm bells ringing in every Western foreign ministry. Everywhere the question was asked anxiously: After Yeltsin, what?
Contradictions
No sooner had the election result been announced than it became clear that the government was riven with contradictions. The most obvious is the open rift between prime minister Chernomyrdin and general Lebed. The former is the most consummate representative of the new class of robbercapitalists who have enriched themselves from "the biggest theft in history." From a faceless bureaucrat, he has become a billionaire controlling a huge oil and gas conglomerate. As prime minister he has a powerful position, and probably enjoys the support of a big section of the nascent bourgeois as well as the imperialists who see him as their most reliable representative.
On the other hand, Lebed is an unprincipled adventurer who only just joined the camp of the "reformers and whose voters probably made the difference between victory and defeat. As a result, he succeeded in wringing out of Yeltsin the key post of head of the Security Council. At least formally, he has concentrated immense power into his hands as head of the army and police. Yet this is not enough for him. Lebed aspires to absolute power, and makes little effort to conceal the fact.
However, even the fact that he was put in charge of the campaign against crime and corruption was, in reality, a calculated manoeuvre to discredit Lebed, since this campaign is doomed to fail before it starts. In order to stamp out crime and corruption in Russia, it would first be necessary to arrest the biggest criminals, who are to be found at the heart of government, commencing with the prime minister. Lebed has attacked corruption in high places, but, so long as the Chernomyrdin clique remain in the saddle, all this remains on the level of worthless demagogy.
By placing Lebed in charge of the army and police - a desperate move by a man afraid of losing the election - Yeltsin was taking a big risk. Everything seems to indicate that Lebed was promised a lot more in exchange for his help in winning the election. But such promises are about as valuable as all the other ones made by Yeltsin, that is, not a lot. Lies, treachery, deceit- these are the stockintrade of the entire regime, and Yeltsin has them worked out as a fine art. Probably at this stage, Lebed does not have a sufficiently strong base to challenge the Chernomyrdin gang. It is not even sure that he has a solid control over the armed forces. But he will be constantly striving to build such a base. Yeltsin is a sick man, who can disappear from the scene at any time. That would be the signal for an open power struggle between the rival factions. Being at a disadvantage, Lebed will try to entangle the CP in his machinations.
It is not clear at this moment whether Zyuganov, or his close collaborators, would be prepared to enter a coalition government. Nor is it clear that, if they were to do so, whether the rest of the Party would accept it. We lack the necessary information to make a judgement on this. But it is likely that such a move would cause sharp differences even in the leadership. Leaders like the CP spokesman A. Lukyanov have at least shown a modicum of understanding when they predicted that Yeltsin would "implode." If the CP remains outside the government, they would pick up a lot of support, thus placing them in a strong position to take power. But everything seems to indicate that the Zyuganov wing would be quite prepared to act as the fifth wheel of Yeltsin's cart.
Split
By this means, Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin intend to split the CP, by drawing sections of the leaders into the thieves' kitchen of corruption. After all, they know these people very well, being "old comrades". A split is guaranteed, if the CP leaders are stupid enough to accept this kind offer. Even now, there must be a lot of unrest in the ranks of the CP. If the leaders take upon themselves the slightest responsibility for the crimes of gangster capitalism, there will be convulsions. At a certain point, the CP will split. Probably they would fuse with Anpilov's Communist Workers' Party, which would get increasing support by remaining outside the government. If there was a strong Trotskyist tendency present, it could get an important echo for a policy based on class independence, workers' democracy and internationalism.
Communist Party
In effect, the old party of the bureaucracy has become transformed into a Communist party, not in the Leninist sense, but like the CPs in the West, i.e. a reformist workers party. This is a peculiar development, which was not foreseen either by Trotsky or ourselves. Once the link with the state was broken, the KPRF has lost its previous character as an extension of the bureaucracy, and come more under the direct pressure of the class. Its upper layers are composed of that section of the old bureaucrats, who have lost out in the division of the spoils. These are the most incompetent, conservative or just unlucky elements. Among them are those whose only disagreement with the nascent bourgeoisie is that they are not part of it. They look with envy at the likes of Chernomyrdin, and would be quite willing to reach a deal with him, if he would make them "an offer they cannot refuse". This faction must be well represented in the Duma group of the party, which Chernomyrdin is skilfully attempting to split.
However, even in its leading layer, the KPRF is not homogenous. Another wing of the bureaucracy looks wistfully to the past, when their power, prestige and income were guaranteed by the "command economy". This section would like to go back to the old system, if they could. However, they are faced with the dilemma that the only way to defeat the nascent bourgeoisie is by mobilising the working class. Apart from the fact that their whole psychology and past and present interests fills them with distrust and lack of confidence in the working class, their entire experience of life has been sitting behind a desk giving orders. They are organically incapable of appealing to the workers, even if they wished to do so.
Below the leading stratum is a large number of "cadres" many of whom are close to the working class and honestly aspire to socialism. However, they lack a genuine MarxistLeninist education, and are also inexperienced in serious work in the masses. Nevertheless, as the crisis develops, many of these can be radicalised and move in the direction of a real Leninist policy. This process will be enormously accelerated in the event of a split in the CP, which is inevitable at a certain stage.
"Time of Troubles"
The confidence of the bourgeois and the West in the future of capitalism in Russia is misplaced. Already there is the outline of a massive crisis in Russia. As the social, economic and political crisis unfolds, their forces will melt away. The idea that Communism cannot return because of Yeltsin's victory is a foolish pipedream. The very confidence of the bourgeois will be a factor in its undoing. Like the bullfrog in Aesop's fable, they are puffed up with their own importance. As a result, they will press on in the direction of "market reform" and will inevitably overreach themselves. They imagine that everything is settled, whereas nothing is settled.
For a Marxist, an election is only an incident in the general process, and not at all the most decisive incident. The real test still lies in the future. With the utter decay of Stalinism, and the general throwing back of consciousness at all levels of society, the most primitive and barbarous ideas have reemerged from the murky slime of a halfforgotten past-Pan Slavism, GreatRussian chauvinism, antiSemitism, astrology, superstition, faith healing, Orthodoxy - all this ideological and spiritual muck is a faithful mirror of social decline. Most striking of all the expressions of this decline is the way in which Zyuganov, instead of combating nationalism and religion, the inseparable soul mates of reaction, above all of Russian reaction, has completely succumbed to these poisonous influences, against which Lenin struggled all his life.
In the absence of understanding, selfstyled intellectuals - not only on the right - take refuge in mysticism, referring to the "Russian soul," and drawing the conclusion from superficial analogies with Russian history that the Russian people are "not suited for democracy", and so on. In reality, such "explanations" explain nothing at all, but can be used as a readymade excuse for the next gangster who seeks to seize power in the name of Russia, Order and Orthodoxy.
Far from the future of Russia being guaranteed, new upheavals and chaos lie on the horizon. Russia has entered a new "Time of Troubles"- smutnoe vremya, as the Russians call it-referring to the period of anarchy and social breakdown which preceded the coming to power of Peter the Great in the first half of the 18th century. The unstable, corrupt, gangster regime of Yeltsin bears some resemblance to the rule of the streltsy, the bandit rulers of Muscovy at that time. But then there was no working class such as the powerful Russian proletariat, which could, with proper leadership, show a way out of the impasse.
As always, historical analogy is a lame substitute for a scientific
analysis of the real class balance of forces. There is nothing
at all inevitable about the descent of Russian society into chaos,
or the victory of Bonapartist reaction, any more than in 1917.
Now, as then, the causes are not to be found in the "Russian
soul," but exclusively in the leadership of the working class
- or the lack of it. The problem of problems is that the Russian
working class has not yet moved as a class. This fact conditions
the whole situation. But it will not last forever.
From Socialist Appeal 44, Sept 1996